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1. Introduction 
From September 9-11 2016 the inaugural meeting of the global parliament of mayors took 
place in The Hague. This global parliament of mayors consisted of mayors from more than 
sixty cities from all over the world. The idea for this parliament comes from the political 
theorist Benjamin Barber, who published the book ‘If mayors ruled the world’ in which he 
states that mayors do all the practical ground work needed to tackle the problems of today 
(Barber, 2013). Due to globalization cities are becoming increasingly on each other. It is with 
this reason that according to Barber (2013), cities should work more closely with other cities 
and more directly, not only via national states. Especially on issues that are border-crossing, 
such as environmental and climate change. With the signing of the Paris Climate Treaty in 
2015 it once more became clear that there is a wide concern about climate change and that 
action is wanted to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.   
It is on the issue of climate change that global co-operation is necessary, but the 
implementation of the solution is needed locally (Fünfgeld, 2015) (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). 
Having the right solutions to neutralise the effects of climate change is an important part of 
dealing with the problem. As cities around the globe have problems that are in some ways 
similar it is possible to find solutions through co-operation and sharing best practices. 
Problematic for this is that it might interfere with the concept of sovereignty of states. If cities 
are truly becoming international actors in their own way, they might decide to determine and 
implement policy that is not consistent with the state. One way cities are now cooperating is 
through Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs). Kern & Bulkeley (2009) have defined 
these networks in the following way: 
“TMNs have three defining characteristics. First, member cities are autonomous and 
free to join or leave. Second, because they appear to be non-hierarchical, horizontal 
and polycentric, such networks are often characterized as a form of self-governance. 
Third, decisions taken within the network are directly implemented by its members. In 
this respect TMNs differ considerably from traditional associations or transnational 
NGOs which concentrate on lobbying and mobilization” Kern & Bulkeley (2009) 
Furthermore Kern & Bulkeley (2009) state that TMNs are networks for pioneers by pioneers. 
The pioneering aspect of this can lead to cities adopt policy that is not in line with state policy 
as cities or municipalities might want to use solutions or introduce policy that is different 
from state policy. 
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An example of this has happened in the United States of America on the issue of climate 
change. The President of the USA, Donald Trump, signed an executive order to promote 
Energy independence and economic growth (The White House, 2017). This order repeals 
several orders signed by the previous President Barack Obama that were intended to reduce 
global warming. The executive order Donald Trump signed, removes restrictions on fossil 
fuels, fuels that are one of the primary sources of CO2 emissions. These CO2 emissions are 
one of the GHGs and are often seen as a primary cause of global warming (Solomon et al., 
2009).  
A day after Donald Trump signed the executive order, a coalition of 75 cities united in the 
Mayors National Climate Action Agenda, stated that they will not follow the agenda of 
Donald Trump if it conflicts with their climate goals (Walker, 2017). Not only will they set 
their own agenda, they have also stated that they will not follow the executive order of the 
federal government as they are convinced it will harm the cities attempts to reduce climate 
change and hurt their local economy.  
Although these events are happening in the USA it is an example where the differences 
between the central government and the lower governments grow larger. For this study the 
municipalities in the Netherlands will be studied. Such an event as previously described has 
not yet occurred in the Netherlands, but Dutch municipalities, like cities in the USA, are 
joining networks for co-operation on climate issues. These networks are one of the ways 
municipalities can find solutions that work for their local situation to problems expected from 
climate change. In this study the variables leading up to membership are researched, to 
establish a pattern on how municipalities deal with the issue of climate change. 
The issue of climate change has been compared to the tragedy of the commons (Lee, 2013) on 
several occasions. Lee (2013) states that if the rational perspective is followed, the 
expectation is that municipalities will not join TMNs as climate change is a global problem, 
and as a rational actor a city would not see itself as being able to have enough impact to really 
reduce the worldwide impact, still in the period of 1990 – 2007 there was a large increase in 
membership of TMNs (Lee, 2013). Following from this trend Lee researches the kind of 
municipalities that join TMNs. He concludes that mostly cities that are entangled in the 
worldwide economy join these networks. The city’s level of globalization is a driving force of 
transnational politics and policies.  
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With his research Lee (2013) focused on the larger cities (the smallest city in the analysis was 
Freiburg with 220,000 inhabitants) in the world. This resulted in the conclusion that hub 
cities, connected in the world economy, play an influential role in a membership of a TMN. 
What the research does not take into account are the smaller cities. As almost 50% of the 
world population still live in cities smaller than 500,000 inhabitants (United Nations, 2015, p. 
17), this is a significant group. Without knowledge about how these smaller entities in local 
politics act, a large part of the worldwide population could be unaccounted for. As Lee 
already states in his article small municipalities are members of TMNs, but Lee does not deal 
with the issue of what the key variables are for small municipalities to join a TMN. Failing to 
deal with this leaves a gap in the literature. This thesis will focus on this gap and attempt to 
quantify the variables that are important for smaller municipalities to join a TMN. This is also 
the reason this study focuses on the municipalities in the Netherlands as there is a wide 
variety of municipalities in the Netherlands that have a low population (<500,000 
inhabitants). To be able to study this issue, the following research question is used: 
Which municipalities join Transnational Municipal Networks focused on climate 
change? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to first delve deeper in the theories and concepts that 
are of importance for this subject. This is done in the following section: Theories and 
concepts. After the explanation of the theories the methods are explained. This research is 
based on the quantitative analysis of all Dutch municipalities to establish variables that are of 
the most importance for membership. The independent variables that are taken into account 
are size, threat of climate change, the ideology of the college of mayor and aldermen and the 
ideology of the alderman in charge of environmental affairs. Following the methods section is 
the result section, which shows the results that were found. These results are discussed in the 
conclusion section where the research question will be answered and the implications for this 
research will be explained. 
2. Theories and concepts 
This section is divided into four different sections. The first section further explains the 
workings of the Transnational Municipal Networks to fully understand what the importance 
of these networks are for municipalities. The second section explains the role of TMNs in the 
wider picture of Multi-Level Governance and bypassing of states. The third section introduces 
the concept of Europeanisation to explain why municipalities become active on the 
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international level and the fourth section introduces the factors explaining membership and 
the hypotheses derived from this. 
2.1 Transnational Municipal Networks 
Kern & Bulkeley (2009) describe TMNs as facilitating municipalities to gain information. 
This is one of the benefits of a TMN. This benefit comes from the way TMNs operate. 
According to Kern & Bulkeley (2009) TMNs operate in two different ways, namely internal 
governing and external governing. Internally, the climate TMNs use the strategies of 
informing and communicating, project funding, co-operation and recognition, benchmarking 
and certification. Examples of informing and communicating are newsletters, visits of 
members to a city and the exchange of best practices. The effectiveness of these is disputed, 
however (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 321). A more effective way according to Kern & 
Bulkeley is to carry out co-operative projects. With these projects the networks aim to work 
toward their goal while at the same time having members in the network co-operate 
intensively. However, this method is resource intensive (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 321). The 
methods of recognition, benchmarking and certification are seen as most effective. According 
to Kern & Bulkeley, the method of recognition offers rewards for good practices, 
benchmarking is the strategy to hold all members to certain defined standards to see how the 
municipalities perform and certification is also a form of reward, where a municipality gets a 
certification when it meets certain conditions. With these methods, the members are 
influenced by best practices and peer pressure to achieve the goals. The weakness in these 
methods lies in the fact that the TMNs depend on voluntary co-operation and the authority of 
TMNs is limited (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009, p. 323). But the way the TMNs operate and what 
they can achieve can be beneficial for member municipalities. The pioneer municipalities that 
are member of TMNs can also, through the TMN, upload their own preferred policy. This 
means that the TMNs are able to influence the state or the European Union to adopt certain 
climate policy that has proved successful with the members of TMNs. 
Giest and Howlett (2013) also mention this need for co-operation. Their research focuses on 
the TMNs that operate in Europe and sees this as a response to opportunities presented by the 
institution of the EU. Giest and Howlett mention that the TMNs are an adaptation to the EU. 
They state two roles of TMNs, namely the enabling of self-governance and governing through 
enabling (Giest & Howlett, 2013). What this means is that through the networks 
municipalities are enabled to incorporate policy that does not directly come from the central 
government and TMNs themselves can influence institutions due to their amassed knowledge 
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about certain issues. This comes from the goals of a network that are determined by Giest and 
Howlett as representing the interest of their members at the European level and facilitating the 
exchange of experience and transnational learning among their constituents (2013, p. 343). 
The goals are further established by Fünfgeld (2015) as providing opportunities for the 
municipalities next to providing knowledge and resources to the municipalities. Fünfgeld also 
mentions the need for local climate change adaptation on this issue and that TMNs can assist 
in this by providing knowledge and resources. The tools that are available to TMNs are more 
limited than the tools available to states, as TMNs have little political power (Betsill and 
Bulkeley, 2006, p. 147). The tools used are in the form of recognition of the problem, 
benchmarking and certification. These are all voluntarily implemented as membership is also 
voluntary. Next to these tools, TMNs are also consulted for technical support, by their 
members and other parties (like the European Commission), and for their expertise on 
applying for funds from the European Union. 
2.2 The impact of TMNs for multi-level governance and bypassing 
Criticizing the regime theory in global environmental governance, Betsill and Bulkeley 
(2006) use multi-level governance (MLG) in order to explain the workings of global 
environmental governance. The regime theory is the set of rules, norms that are involved with, 
in this case, global environmental governance. Regime theory usually focuses on multilateral 
treaties on specific issues, in this case climate change. This leads to states still being the 
primary actors within regime theory. Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) argue that this does not 
properly portray the reality in the area of global environmental governance. Betsill and 
Bulkeley (2006) criticize the regime theory for its top-down nature and the verticality of 
relationships, meaning that it ignores the influence of regions and local government. To 
accurately portray how climate governance comes to realisation, it is necessary to apply the 
multi-level governance described by Marks and Hooghe (2004). With the MLG theory it is 
possible to describe the complexity of climate change and the emergence of a global civil 
society dealing with this issue. This global civil society, consisting of non-governmental 
organisations and issue groups, is consistent with type two multi-level governance described 
by Marks and Hooghe (2004), which means that there is co-operation between actors on 
multiple levels of government which is beyond national borders and mostly focused on a 
single issue. In this study the case of climate change is studied, which is one of the issues 
where global co-operation is necessary, but the policy to address this issue has to be 
implemented locally. 
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According to Fünfgeld (2015) climate adaptation is a multi-level, multi-actor endeavour that 
requires high degrees of collaboration (2015, p. 70). The voluntary nature of membership of a 
TMN allows for more flexibility compared to adaptation to governmental policy, meaning 
that municipalities can implement solutions at their own accord. Municipalities in the 
Netherlands have options to experiment, but having the option to share knowledge through 
TMNs creates extra opportunities for experimentation and innovation enabling new ideas to 
prosper. Having an arena where ideas can prosper creates an environment where the solutions 
to local problems can fully develop, and from this patterns can emerge showing the best 
solution (best practices). The expectation of Toly (2008) is that states will take over local 
climate policy and apply it to national policy. According to Toly this can happen by 
normative innovation and the diffusion of policy (2008, p.352). As this happens, the 
pioneering municipalities will have had influence on state policy. This is in accordance with 
Kern and Bulkeley (2009) and the MLG theory by Hooghe and Marks (2004).  
A point of critique on the MLG theory is that the state is no longer the central unit of analysis, 
which conflicts with the realism theory. This theory states that states are the central actors. 
Another aspect of the MLG theory is that local government can bypass policy of the state, 
with the consequence that states lose influence. By studying TMN membership and its 
impacts, it can be established what the impacts are of TMNs on the bypassing of states. 
According to Tatham (2010), bypassing of the state by municipalities does happen (Tatham, 
2010), but there is also co-operation between the national state and municipalities (Tatham, 
2010). This is part of the growing complexity municipalities operate in as Kübler and Pagano 
state (2012, p. 12). 
This statement is confirmed by Khanna (2016), who describes the role of interconnectedness 
through supply chains. Cities are seen as critical hubs for the logistics of goods worldwide. 
Cities are increasing in importance and Khanna (2016) agrees with Barber (2013) that states 
and borders are of less importance for cities. Globalisation has caused cities around the world 
to be interconnected with each other leading to more co-operation between cities. On the other 
hand, Kübler and Pagano write about the influence European integration has had on 
increasing the transnational activities of cities (Kübler and Pagano, 2012, p. 13).  
2.3 TMNs and Europeanisation 
With European integration municipalities have had to adopt new European rules. This new set 
of rules caused cities to adapt to the European rules, this process is referred to as 
Europeanisation. Kübler and Pagano (2012) and Kübler and Piliutye (2007) describe the 
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processes of download and upload Europeanisation. Download Europeanisation means that 
municipalities are adapting their policies, practices and preferences to the constraints of the 
EU (Kubler and Piliutye, 2007, p. 365). Upload Europeanisation means that a municipality 
tries to influence policy of the European Union directly, or indirectly as a member of a TMN 
(Kübler and Piliutyte, 2007) (ROB, 2013). The level of Europeanisation of a municipality is 
an indicator of how municipalities deal with uploading and downloading. When a 
municipality is more Europeanised, it gets more involved with policy. One way municipalities 
deal with this is through TMNs.  
Europeanisation is also a driver for municipalities to co-operate and become active on the 
international level. On the subject of climate change, it is important for small municipalities to 
co-operate as the emissions disregard borders and it is a technical subject where many factors 
play a role. According to Hakelberg (2014) climate change needs to be addressed everywhere, 
as there are no single solutions available. Hakelberg also states that 50-75% of the emissions 
that cause climate change can be reduced by local government action (2014). Most 
municipalities, according to Hakelberg (2014) are underfunded, which could be troubling. In 
addition, Hakelberg states that TMNs have shown they help spread local climate adaptation 
through pioneering cities. These cities inspire other municipalities to act and also influence 
the national government (Hakelberg, 2014, p. 107). 
Membership of a TMN is not only an indication of increased Europeanisation of a 
municipality, but also of the internationalization of the municipalities. Previous research by 
Fleurke and Willemsen (2007) has shown that the EU has direct and indirect effects on 
municipalities and also constrains and enhances the municipalities. One way of enhancing the 
municipality is by membership of TMNs. With the aim of this study to establish which 
municipalities join TMNs, researching which municipalities seek international co-operation 
allows for the predictability of municipalities. This study, which researches small 
municipalities, will allow for the profiling of small municipalities (500,000 inhabitants). 
2.4 Factors explaining membership of a TMN 
To fully understand the role that municipalities have in international politics and within their 
state it is necessary to determine the factors which drive municipalities to become members of 
TMNs. According to De Rooij (2002 p. 464), the size of a municipality is an important 
explaining factor to be able to actively lobby for EU funds, in addition it could be an 
important explanation for joining a transnational network. As membership has its benefits, it 
is also an investment. Larger municipalities are more likely to have the resources to actually 
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join and participate in transnational networks. The size of a municipality is determined by the 
budget of a municipality. Previous research by Schaap (2015, p. 129) states that the budget 
strongly correlates with the population in the Netherlands. Budget more accurately determines 
the size of a municipality, as the budget determines what a municipality can do. Therefore the 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the municipality is, the more likely it is to be part of a Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Small islands were the first to ratify the Paris climate agreement (King, 2016). These island 
states say that they want to see the agreement ratified by every signatory party, as these island 
states are being affected by the impacts of climate change already. The island of Kiribati is 
one of these examples (Ives, 2016). Kiribati could possibly disappear as a whole due to rising 
sea levels. The same goes for the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands already has a long history of being partially under sea level. With a rising sea 
level the Netherlands faces more challenges of keeping the sea at bay. The municipalities of 
Goeree-Overflakkee and Ameland, which are islands situated in the North Sea, are 
implementing sustainable technologies (Postma, 2017) (van Dijk, 2016). This hypothesis 
examines if the threat of climate change matters for municipalities to join a TMN. The threat 
of climate change for this study has been determined as the risk of flooding. As previously 
mentioned the Netherlands is a country with a low elevation level, and there are several rivers 
flowing through the country. This means that there is a large chance of flooding in parts of the 
Netherlands. The Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) published a report 
where four future climate scenarios are established for the Netherlands (Koninklijk 
Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut, 2015). The scenarios mention that the rising sea level 
and flooding of riverbanks are major threats for the Netherlands. An important side effect of 
flooding is the silting of lands, which makes them unsuitable for agriculture. It is 
acknowledged that other factors, such as drought and ecological hazards, could also be seen 
as a threat, but for this study flooding is seen as the primary threat for the Netherlands. The 
hypothesis will therefore be: 
Hypothesis 2: Municipalities that are more likely to be threatened by climate change, are 
more likely to be part of a Transnational Municipal Network 
De Rooij  (2002) states that policy priorities that public servants have play a role in the 
measure of Europeanisation of municipalities. It is expected that the ideology plays a role in 
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membership of a TMN as well. As the college of mayor and aldermen is the executive branch 
of the municipality, it is expected that the composition of this college is leading for 
membership. Thus, for the following hypothesis the ideology of the local city college is 
analysed. This ideology is based on national political parties and their local divisions and 
local political parties. Parties that are more involved with climate change issues are expected 
to have a positive effect on the membership of municipalities of TMNs. 
Hypothesis 3: College of mayor and aldermen consisting of greener political parties have a 
higher likelihood to be part of a Transnational Municipal Networks 
Along with ideology the individual that decides on issues of climate change can also be 
influential on the membership of a TMN. As has been stated by Schaap, each individual 
alderman can give a different meaning to the position (2015, p. 71). With this ability to create 
their own role within the municipality it is worth researching the impact of the individual 
alderman. With this hypothesis it is tested whether municipalities with an alderman who has 
an ideology that acknowledges climate change are more likely to be part of a TMN.  
Hypothesis 4: When an alderman in charge of environmental affairs is affiliated with a 
climate favourable party, there is a higher likelihood that a municipality is part of 
Transnational Municipal Network 
With these hypotheses it is possible to answer the research question as these factors are 
expected to have an effect on the decision making to become a member of a TMN.  
3. Data and Methods 
In this section the research method is described. Firstly, the case selection is described after 
which the scoring of membership is explained. In the second section the data collection and 
analysis are explained per hypothesis. 
3.1 Case Selection 
Lee (2013) researched membership of TMNs and that research mainly focused on large cities, 
but according to statistics from the United Nations around 50% of the worldwide population 
live in cities smaller than 500,000 inhabitants (United Nations, 2015, p. 17). This is why the 
municipalities of the Netherlands have been selected as the subject of this case. The Dutch 
municipalities are comparable to cities as there is a large urbanization rate of 90,5% 
(Worldbank, n.d.) in the Netherlands. Most of the people live in or near an urbanized zone. 
The Netherlands has also been selected because it has a wide variety of municipalities ranging 
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from 960 inhabitants to 799,278 (Table 1). As a large part of the inhabitants in the world live 
in cities of these sizes and membership of a TMN can lead to more local climate adaptation, 
analysing the Netherlands can explain what factors are of importance for local governments to 
implement climate favourable policy. As Dutch municipalities are well-developed, they can 
serve as a crucial case, that if Dutch municipalities do not join TMNs it is expected that very 
few municipalities with less than 500,000 inhabitants will join a TMN. 
Table 1. Population statistics of Dutch Municipalities 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Total number of 
inhabitants 
382 960 799278 42768.91 
     
Due to the wide variety of Dutch municipalities it will be possible to predict how 
municipalities of varying sizes behave. Another advantage of the Dutch municipalities is that 
their budget is mostly based on its population size (Schaap, 2015). This is why the 
municipalities of the Netherlands have been chosen for this study. 
The Dutch municipal members of TMNs are listed in Table 2 along with the network they are 
part of. The TMNs selected are the ones stated by Kern & Bulkeley (2009) and Benjamin 
Barber (2013) as environmental municipal networks. These are the most important TMNs on 
the issue of climate that have members in the Netherlands. Of the Dutch municipalities, there 
are 20 municipalities that are individual members of one or more TMNs, meaning that they 
don’t share the membership through a regional collective organisation. There are three 
regional collective memberships of TMNs, namely Cities Northern Netherlands, Brabantstad 
and Netwerkstad Twente and two national collective memberships, namely Climate Alliance 
Netherlands and the Association of Dutch Municipalities.  
To research the membership, it is important that the TMNs have no barriers that limit 
municipalities to join. This is the reason that the TMNs C40 cities and Eurocities are not taken 
into account for this research as these have requirements for membership. C40 cities requires 
members to be megacities or leading innovative cities (C40 Cities, 2012) and Eurocities only 
includes municipalities that have at least 250,000 inhabitants (Eurocities, 2008). This leaves 
the TMNs Climate Alliance, Energie Cities, ICLEI and Covenant of Mayors for Climate & 
Energy as the TMNs whose membership is researched.  
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Table 2. Transnational Municipal Networks membership overview 
 
Memberships are divided into three categories, namely full membership, regional collective 
membership and national collective membership. Full membership is valued as 1, regional 
collective membership is valued as 0,5 and national collective membership is valued as 0,1. 
The national collective membership of the Association of Dutch Municipalities is excluded 
from this research, as all Dutch municipalities are members of this organisation. This 
organisation would have no effect on the results, as all municipalities would score 0,1. For 
this research all municipalities in the Netherlands are used and the dependant variable is the 
membership of a Transnational Municipal Network. 
Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Operational level Dutch individual 
members 
Dutch collective 
members 
Climate Alliance Europe The Hague, 
Geldermalsen 
Climate Alliance 
Netherlands 
(Klimaatverbond 
Nederland)  
Energie Cities Europe Delft, Heerlen, Utrecht, 
Zoetermeer 
Cities Northern 
Netherlands, Climate 
Alliance Netherlands 
ICLEI (Cities for 
Climate Protection 
program) 
Europe Eindhoven, Nijmegen, 
Rotterdam, Tilburg 
Association of 
Netherlandse 
Municipalities 
(Vereniging van 
Nederlandse 
Gemeenten) 
C40 Cities Global Amsterdam, Rotterdam  
Covenant of Mayors 
for Climate & Energy 
Europe & Neighbour 
region 
Almere, Amsterdam, 
Arnhem, Breda, Delft, 
Eindhoven, Haarlem, 
Heerhugowaard, 
Heerlen, Helmond, 
Lingewaard, Midden-
Delftland, Nijmegen, 
Rotterdam, s-
Hertogenbosch, The 
Hague, Tilburg, Utrecht, 
Zoetermeer 
 
Eurocities Europe Amsterdam, 
Eindhoven, Rotterdam, 
The Hague, Utrecht 
Brabantstad, 
Netwerkstad Twente 
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3.2 Data collection & analyses 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
The data for this hypothesis are collected from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the 
Netherlands (CBS) (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, n.d.). These data are publicly 
available and offer information about the budget and inhabitants of the Dutch municipalities. 
The data used for the analyses are the most recent complete data on the budget from the year 
2013. To test the hypothesis only the budget is analysed and not the number of inhabitants, as 
there is a strong correlation between the two. To participate in the selected TMNs, funds are 
required and not population. 
Finally, the municipalities are coded according to their membership TMNs, and are then 
analysed on correlation. The budget is compared to membership using Pearson’s r for 
correlation, as the budget is on a ratio scale. With this test, it is possible to not only test for 
correlation, but also to check if the result is significant. If a correlation is found and the result 
is significant, this means that Hypothesis 1: The larger the municipality is, the more likely it is 
to be part of a Transnational Municipal Network, can be corroborated.  
3.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
For the second hypothesis, the threat of climate change for a municipality is analysed. To 
analyse this, it is necessary to operationalize the meaning of threat. Threat is operationalized 
by the risk of flooding. As flooding is one of the primary risks of climate change for the 
Netherlands, this will determine the threat. This operationalisation does not incorporate 
factors such as droughts and other impacts from climate change, but flooding can be 
considered the largest threat, as large parts of the Netherlands are below sea level. 
To analyse the flooding risk and to be able to test the hypothesis it is necessary to use a map 
which shows the flooding risk per municipality. This map is made available by the provinces 
of the Netherlands (Interprovinciaal overleg, n.d.) as Dutch provinces are legally required to 
assess and publish the risks. The map is publicly available and displays all risks in the 
Netherlands. For the analysis flooding risks of one in ten years are checked. In this way the 
map can be visually analysed per municipality to see if they are at risk of flooding. Examples 
of the map are shown in Appendix V and VI. A municipality with a risk of flooding is coded 
with a 1 and a municipality without a risk is coded with a 0.  
The collected data is then analysed on correlation with membership of a TMN. The method 
used for this is Pearson’s r. If a correlation is found and the result is significant this means that 
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Hypothesis 2: Municipalities that are more likely to be threatened by climate change are more 
likely to be part of a Transnational Municipal Network, can be corroborated.  
3.2.3. Hypothesis 3 and 4 
The data for the third and fourth hypothesis will be collected for a random sample of 20% of 
the municipalities. The data will be collected from the websites of the municipalities. The data 
on the composition of the college of mayor and aldermen is publicly available for each 
municipality in the Netherlands. The municipality website mentions the composition of the 
college of mayor and aldermen and in most cases also the party alignment of the alderman. 
When the alignment of an alderman is not mentioned, the almanac website of the government 
is consulted (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relation, n.d.). All data found on the 
municipality websites will be checked with the data on the almanac site.  
The individual parties are then coded into SPSS to be able to rank the parties. The national 
parties will be ranked on their agenda views on environmental policies. For this study, the 
views of the national party are taken for the local divisions of these parties as these are 
comparable. This is because national political parties also serve as training opportunities, and 
the local divisions can vote during a party congress allowing them to influence national party 
policy (Andeweg & Irwin, 2014, p. 82). Local divisions of national parties also are part of the 
aggregation of interest that form the policy of the national party, meaning that national policy 
can be influenced by the local divisions. 
For the ranking the recent election programmes of the national parties will be consulted. 
These election programmes have been analysed by different parties on the issue of climate 
change and sustainability (Planbureau voor de leefomgeving, 2017) (MVO, n.d.). The data 
from the Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving would be the most accurate to use, as these 
calculate the true effects of the party’s plan, but as not every political party allowed the PBL 
to calculate their climate plans not all political parties have the data available. Therefore, it is 
necessary to use different sources for this ranking. Three other groups have made a ranking of 
the climate policy of political parties. These groups are the MVO, De Groene Zaak and 
Klimaatlabel. The ranking of these groups is listed in Table 3. 
To analyse the parties this study uses climate scores from three different groups. These groups 
all use a different scale to rank the parties. The first scale from MVO ranges from 0-27 and 
the political parties are given scores on nine different categories. The maximum score 
achievable is 27, which none of the parties achieved. The second scale from De Groene Zaak 
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ranges from 0-19 and the scoring is based on seven different categories. The third scale is 
from Klimaatlabel, which has a range from 0-5. Political parties are ranked based on voting 
behaviour in the Dutch Parliament. To be able to compare the different ranking scales these 
have to be converted using the following formula: 𝑝𝑦/ max scale ∗ 10 where p stands for the 
score of the political party on that particular scale. The mean of these scores is then taken as 
the climate score of that party. The results of this can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3. Climate score for national political parties calculated 
 
As previously mentioned, the data from the PBL would be the most representative of climate 
effects and therefore these data are used as a control to see if the climate scores are valid 
representations of climate effects. As the PBL does not have data on all political parties this 
analysis is done on the parties for which the data is available. The political parties that are 
included in this analysis are CU, GL, PvdA, D66, SP and VVD. The average on the climate 
score of these parties is 6,60. The average score that these parties have on the PBL scale is 
5,97. A t-test was done to test if this difference is significant. The results (Table 4) show that 
the difference is not significant. Therefore the average climate scores from MVO, De Groene 
Zaak and Klimaatlabel are used in the calculations of the college scores. 
Party MVO Norm De Groene Zaak Norm Klimaatlabel Norm Average Climate score 
CU 23 8.52 16 8.42 5 10 8.70 
PvdD 21 7.78 12 6.32 5 10 7.77 
GL 20 7.41 19 10.00 5 10 8.89 
PvdA 17 6.30 15 7.89 2 4 5.85 
D66 13 4.81 19 10.00 4 8 7.44 
SP 10 3.70 10 5.26 4 8 5.53 
SGP 5 1.85 12 6.32 2 4 3.99 
CDA 3 1.11 6 3.16 2 4 2.72 
VVD 2 0.74 7 3.68 1 2 2.12 
PVV 0 0.00 1 0.53 0 0 0.18 
Scale 0-27  0-19  0-5  5.32 
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Table 4. T-test of the difference between PBL scores and calculated climate scores 
 
This ranking is only valid for national parties. For local parties that are only acting within one 
municipality a different ranking is needed. For the local political parties, the election 
programmes of those parties are analysed. The election programmes of the elections from the 
year 2014 are used, as these are the most recent ones and the current college was formed out 
of these elections. To analyse the election programmes on the issue of climate a checklist is 
made (see Table 5). This checklist is used to rank the local political parties. The checklist is 
leading in this analysis, but there are significant differences in the extensiveness of the 
election programmes of local political parties. Therefore in some cases it has been necessary 
to deviate from the checklist. 
Table 5. Checklist used during the analysis of local political parties 
 
All the scores of the political parties will be made comparable to be able to define the average 
score of the full college. This is done in the same way as the climate scores of the groups used 
for the ranking of the national parties. This average score is then analysed in SPSS to find the 
correlation and significance.  For this analysis Pearson’s r is used as the values are on a ratio 
scale. The results are also plotted on a scatterplot to visualize the results. If a correlation is 
found and the results are significant this means that Hypothesis 3: Colleges of mayor and 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 5.97 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
AverageCS .587 5 .583 .62667 -2.1173 3.3706 
 
Checklist Climate policy local political parties 
Has a separate heading for environmental 
policy 
Mentions issues like sustainability, 
environmental and climate change and 
sustainable energy and construction 
Has concrete plans to reduce the impact on the 
climate 
States itself as a green party 
Scoring scale 1-5 
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aldermen consisting of political parties focused on climate change have a higher likelihood to 
be part of a Transnational Municipal Networks, can be corroborated. 
To control for the reliability of the checklist, compared to the climate scores of the national 
parties the results of the local parties are compared to the national parties. This is done by a t-
test based on the average climate scores of colleges of mayor and aldermen with local parties 
in them and the average climate scores of colleges of mayor and aldermen without local 
parties. From the random sample of 20% totalling 81 municipalities, 53 have local political 
parties. 24 municipalities only have parties in the college that are considered national parties. 
The average climate score of the colleges with local political parties is 4.53 and the average 
climate score of the college without local political parties is 4.36. Following from the t-test 
(Table 6) the difference between the scores is not considered significant. This proves that the 
scoring checklist does not deviate from the climate scores of the national parties. 
Table 6. T-test of the difference between colleges with and without local parties 
 
To analyse the fourth hypothesis, the same data collected from hypothesis three can be used. 
As the fourth hypothesis analyses the individual alderman in charge of environmental affairs, 
the party ideology can be found from the same sources of hypothesis three. To determine the 
alderman in charge of environmental affairs, the portfolio of the alderman has to be checked. 
Most colleges of mayor and aldermen divide the portfolios differently. Each municipality can 
have a different division of tasks between mayor and aldermen. To determine the alderman in 
charge of environmental affairs it is then necessary to look for patterns and crucial portfolios. 
There are two crucial portfolios that determine whether an alderman is in charge of 
environmental issues, namely the portfolios sustainability (duurzaamheid) and environment 
(milieu). Other indicators are the portfolios nature (natuur), green (groen), energy transition 
(energietransitie) and water management (waterbeheer). Even though these portfolios are 
indicative for determining the alderman in charge of environmental affairs, there are 
exceptions to this method. In some cases the portfolios mentioned are divided between 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 4.364166667 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Climate College Score 1.098 52 .277 .16527 -.1368 .4673 
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different aldermen (and in some cases the mayor). In these cases the topics sustainability and 
environment were leading and between these two, sustainability is considered the most 
important indicator, as this is the portfolio that incorporates most aspects of dealing with 
climate change.  
After determining the alderman in charge of environmental affairs the score of this individual 
is based on the party score calculated during hypothesis three. Thus, the score of the 
individual is based on the party this individual is aligned to. These scores are then analysed on 
correlation and significance with membership of a TMN. The results are also plotted on a 
scatterplot to visualize the results. If a correlation is found and the result is significant, this 
means that the Hypothesis 4: When an alderman in charge of environmental affairs is focused 
on climate issues, there is a higher likelihood that a municipality is part of Transnational 
Municipal Network, can be corroborated. 
To further establish the validity of the checklist discussed before, the scores of the alderman 
in charge of environmental affairs are also used as a control. This is done in the same way as 
with the t-test of table 6. There are 23 municipalities that have an alderman in charge of 
environmental affairs that is from a local political party and the score of this group averages 
5,16. The other group of 54 municipalities average a climate score of 5,26. The t-test (Table 
7) on the groups show there is not a significant difference, further confirming that the 
checklist does not deviate from the climate scores of the national parties. Another finding that 
may be of interest is the fact that for the college scores the groups with local political parties 
have an average score that is higher than the other groups, and with the alderman scorings the 
local political parties have a lower average score. This means that there is no structural error 
causing the scores to be consistently higher or lower. These t-tests have shown that, although 
simplistic of nature, the checklist is a valid measurement tool compared to the climate scores 
of the national parties.  
Table 7. T-test of the difference between aldermen from local parties and aldermen from local national parties 
 
One-Sample Test 
 
Test Value = 5.16087 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
Alderman Score .262 53 .794 .09469 -.6294 .8188 
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4. Results  
This section is divided into four parts. Each part describes one of the hypotheses. The first 
part shows the results of the budget, the second part describes the results of the risks of 
flooding, the third part shows the results of the climate score of the college and the final part 
describes the results of the climate score of the alderman of environmental affairs. 
4.1 Impact of Budget 
As mentioned in chapter three the data for the analysis of the budget is used for all 
municipalities. In total there is data available on 382 municipalities. With a total of 388 
municipalities in the Netherlands this means that there is no data available for six 
municipalities. This is caused by the mergers of several municipalities. The budget data is 
from 2013 and most mergers of municipalities happened in 2016. Therefore, all municipalities 
that are now non-existent are excluded from the analysis and from the merged municipalities, 
the combined budget data of 2013 is used. 
Of the 382 municipalities, twenty are full members of the researched TMNs. Four 
municipalities are regional collective members through Cities Northern Netherlands and 158 
municipalities are national collective members. With the data of the budgets retrieved from 
the CBS, a relationship was found between the budget and the membership. This correlation 
can be seen in Table 7. Using the Pearson’s r test for correlation a value was found of 0.522. 
The result is also significant. This means that the budget of a municipality has influence on 
the decision to be part of a TMN. 
Table 8. Correlation between budget of a municipality and membership of a TMN 
 
The result was also plotted (Figure 1). To accurately display the results a log scale is used, 
because there is a large difference between the smallest and largest budgets. By changing the 
data to a log scale it is possible to visualize the influence of budget. With these results it is 
possible to corroborate the hypothesis, meaning that when a municipality is larger 
(operationalized as budget) it has a higher likelihood to be part of a TMN.  
 
 Budget of the 
municipality 
(x1000) 
Whether the municipality is a 
member of a Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Pearson Correlation ,522
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
N 382 
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Figure 1. Visualization of the correlation between the budget and membership of a TMN 
 
The influence of the results is further discussed in the conclusion 
4.2 Impact of location 
For the flood risk the risk chart of the Netherlands has been consulted. The risk of flooding is 
once in ten years. The results found during the analyses of this hypothesis points at a 
negligible negative effect. Municipalities that are at risk of flooding have a correlation of -
0.002 (table 9) with being a member of a TMN. This result is negligible and not significant, 
meaning that this result is not in line with the hypothesis. The hypothesis is therefore not 
corroborated and the risk of flooding does not correlate with membership of a TMN. 
 
Table 9. Correlation between risk of flooding and membership of a TMN 
 
 Risk of flooding 
Whether the municipality is a 
member of a Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Pearson Correlation -,002 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,973 
N 382 
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For the impact of the threat of climate change the hypothesis is not supported. For the 
Netherlands, the risk of flooding is a realistic threat, but the problem arises from the further 
operationalization of the concept threat as discussed in the conclusion.  
Figure 2. Visualization of the correlation between the membership of a TMN and the risk of flooding 
 
4.3 Influence of the ideology 
As mentioned in chapter 3 the influence of the ideology of the college of mayor and aldermen 
is analysed by taking the climate scores of the college and comparing those to the membership 
of a TMN. This has been done on a random sample of 20% of the municipalities, which totals 
to 81 municipalities of which four municipalities are invalid due to missing scores for local 
political parties. These parties could not be ranked because their election program could not 
be retrieved. The analysis was done on the 78 valid municipalities and resulted in a 
correlation of 0.339 (Table 10). The result of the analysis is significant. This means that 
colleges that have a higher climate score are more likely to be part of a TMN. With this result 
the hypothesis, colleges of mayor and aldermen consisting of political parties focused on 
climate change have a higher likelihood to be part of a Transnational Municipal Networks, 
can be corroborated.  
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Table 10. Correlation between Climate score of the college and membership of a TMN 
 
The data is also plotted to visualize the results (Figure 3). It can be seen that there is a 
relation, but it also shows that the relation is not as strong as the relation between budget and 
membership. Ideology however has an effect on membership. 
Figure 3. Visualization of the correlation between climate score of the college and membership of a TMN 
 
The ideology of the college has a correlation with membership, meaning that politics matters. 
Parties with favourable views on climate do have an impact on membership. This relationship 
allows for the further prediction of the behaviour of municipalities. As Kern & Bulkeley 
(2009) discuss, TMNs are networks for pioneers by pioneers and it can be expected that the 
pioneers are most likely found in the municipalities that have colleges with a high climate 
score. Still, the correlation is not 100%, so this means that there is a significant number of 
municipalities that are a member of a TMN without having a college with a high climate 
 College_Score 
Whether the municipality is a 
member of a Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Pearson Correlation ,339
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 
N 78 
 
23 
 
score. This means that there are other variables at play as well, such as the previously 
mentioned budget. But it can be stated from this study that politics matters in the membership 
of TMNs. 
4.4 Influence of the individual 
The analysis on the influence of the individual has been done in a similar way as the ideology 
of the college. The same random sample used for the test on ideology is used in the analysis 
of the influence of the individual. For this analysis, there are 80 valid cases as only the score 
for the individual in charge of environmental affairs is needed. For the valid cases, a 
relationship was found and this correlation is 0.311 (Table 11). The results of this analysis are 
also significant. Due to the nature of the data there is an overlap in data between the ideology 
and the influence of the individual. This does not have a significant influence on the results as 
the variables are tested with the aim to test different concepts. 
Table 11. Correlation between climate score of alderman of environmental affairs and membership of a TMN 
 
  
In Figure 4 the results can be observed. Individual alderman that have a high climate score are 
more likely to be members of a TMN, with the exception of one case which is the 
municipality Emmen.  
  
 Alderman_Scor
e 
Whether the municipality is a 
member of a Transnational 
Municipal Network 
Pearson Correlation ,311
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,005 
N 80 
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Figure 4. Visualization of the correlation between climate score of the alderman in charge of Environmental affairs and 
membership of a TMN 
 
The influence of the individual has a correlation with membership. Similar to ideology, it 
means that politics matter. In this case, it is the politics of the individual alderman in charge of 
environmental affairs. This is in line with the literature by Kern & Bulkeley (2009) as well, as 
they state that individuals play an important role in the networks. It is the level of activity of 
individuals that can make or break the use of a TMN for a municipality. It helps to have 
individuals who are ideologically more inclined to have a positive view on climate policy. 
With individuals who do not have a high climate score, it is expected they will not take action 
to become a member of a TMN. As membership of a TMN is voluntary and not required by 
the national government it makes sense for individuals to withhold from membership as (a) 
they are less likely to be motivated to do it and (b) might not think that member of a TMN 
will provide any benefits.  
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5. Conclusion 
This study has focused on the municipalities in the Netherlands and their membership of 
climate focused TMNs. With the results presented in the previous section, it is possible to say 
which variables have a correlation with membership and which hypotheses have been proven. 
The variables budget, ideology of the college and ideology of the alderman of environmental 
affairs all have a significant correlation with membership, with budget having the highest 
correlation. Hypotheses one, three and four can be corroborated. The threat of climate change 
does not have a correlation with membership and thus the hypothesis must be rejected. The 
explanation for this is that threat perception is not directly related to actual, as threat is a 
psychological perception. It is studied by Whitmarsh (2008) that there is no difference in risk 
perception between flood victims and non-victims. This leads me to believe that the variable 
tested does not accurately correspond with the threat perception level of a municipality’s 
population and it is this perception that could lead to membership.  
The current study only focused on the college and the individual alderman as these are the 
main actors making the decisions in the municipality, but there are multiple different actors 
that play a role in a municipality. Actors like the city council members, civil servants and 
inhabitants have a possible influence on the decision-making. To further establish the effects 
of individuals on membership, it is necessary to research municipalities in depth, still the 
results of this analysis establish the connection between individuals and membership. 
Returning to the research question of, Which municipalities join Transnational Municipal 
Networks focused on climate change? It can be concluded that municipalities with a higher 
budget, an ideology favouring climate adaptation and an individual in charge of 
environmental affairs with a high climate score are more likely to join TMNs. This knowledge 
adds to the already existing knowledge about TMNs by establishing the behaviour of smaller 
municipalities. This study expands on the research by Lee (2015) and makes it more clear 
what role municipalities with a small budget play. The consequence of this could be that small 
municipalities will have more difficulty to implement climate adaptation measures. Small 
municipalities could also learn from the member cities, as the member cities play an 
inspirational role. As previously stated, this inspirational role can also have an effect on the 
policy of the national government. 
With the results of the study of the influence of ideology it can then be stated that 
municipalities with a high climate score are more likely to be a member of a transnational 
municipal network and can thus indirectly influence national governments to implement 
26 
 
climate adaptation policy, but as the effects of this are not directly tested, this remains to be 
seen. The opposite effect could also occur, that municipalities with a low climate score could 
affect the policy of national government through other TMNs. Further research is needed on 
this subject in order to establish the impact municipalities with different ideologies have on 
the state.  
Further research is also recommended on the role individuals play in TMNs. From this study, 
it was found that there is a correlation between the alderman in charge of environmental 
affairs and membership, but more research focused on the way individuals affect membership 
could provide more insights to the internationalisation and Europeanisation of municipalities. 
This could lead to a theory that more accurately predicts the behaviour of municipalities 
within their states and internationally.  
As Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) and Fünfgeld (2015) described, the issue of climate change 
requires international co-operation. With membership of a TMN, municipalities are more 
likely to experiment and try innovative ideas. This allows for the profiling that Kern & 
Bulkeley used of TMNs being networks of pioneers for pioneers. With the results from this 
study, it is possible to partly state the characteristics of a pioneering municipality. According 
to this research, a pioneering municipality is a municipality that needs to have some budget 
capacity, the college consists of parties that incorporate climate policy in their plans and the 
individuals that deal with the issue on a local level should be favourable towards climate 
adaptation.  
This research has attempted to fill up a gap in literature that could play a role in the global 
governance of climate change. With this study it is possible to more accurately portray the 
workings of municipalities and how these municipalities act on the issue of climate change. 
The research allows for the prediction of the behaviour of municipalities. Further study on this 
subject could make it easier to predict the behaviour of small municipalities and cities more 
predictable. As almost 50% of the urban population live in these smaller units this would 
allow for the predictability of climate adaptation to a large part of the world population.  
Small municipalities and cities that do not have the budget to become a member of a TMN 
might need to seek co-operation with other municipalities to effectively deal with climate 
change. Examples of this are found in the Netherlands, where some municipalities have 
decided to co-operate. Brabantstad, Netwerkstad Twente and Cities Northern Netherlands are 
co-operations between multiple municipalities with the goal to make up for the lack of size of 
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the individual municipality. By co-operating within their region, these municipalities are able 
to reap the benefits from a TMN. It remains to be seen how this regionalisation will develop 
and how TMNs will impact local climate adaptation. With this study, the behaviour of diverse 
municipalities has become more predictable. The diversity of municipalities in the 
Netherlands shows that there are always some pioneers willing to deal with the issues. The 
pioneers with the ability to inspire others through diverse adaptation will possibly lead to 
unified action against climate change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Dataset available from author 
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7. Appendices 
7.1 Kieswijzer duurzame economie 
 
Appendix 1. Kieswijzer duurzame economie (De Groene Zaak, n.d.) 
7.2 MVO 
 
Appendix 2. MVO (MVO, n.d.) 
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7.3 Climate label 
 
 
Appendix 3. Climate label (De Nederlandse Klimaatbeweging, n.d.)  
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7.4 Randomly sampled municipalities 
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7.5 Example of the risicokaart used for hypothesis 2 
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